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PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL PEOPLE IN WATER MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE MAE SA WATERSHED, NORTHERN THAILAND 
 




In the early 1990s, Thailand launched an ambitious program of decentralized 
governance, conferring greater responsibilities upon sub-district administrations and providing 
fiscal opportunities for local development planning. This process was reinforced by Thailand’s 
new Constitution of 1997, which explicitly assures individuals, communities and local 
authorities the right to participate in the management of natural resources. 
Drawing on a study of water management in the Mae Sa watershed, northern Thailand, 
this study analyzes to what extent the constitutional right for participation has been put into 
practice. To this end, a stakeholder analysis was conducted in the watershed, with a focus on 
the local people’s interests and strategies in water management and the transformation of 
participatory policies through government agencies at the local level. Government line 
departments were categorized into development- and conservation-oriented agencies. 
While government officers stressed the importance of stakeholder inclusion and 
cooperation with the local people, there is a sharp contrast between the official rhetoric and the 
reality on the ground. The analysis reveals that government officers, particularly in the 
conservation-oriented agencies, are not disposed to devolve power to lower levels due to the 
fear of losing their traditional mandate and persistent stereotypes about local communities’ 
incompetence to manage water resources in a sustainable way. On their part, villagers do not 
perceive a tangible change in the implementation of water policies and retain a widely 
negative image of government officers. 
In conclusion, the participation of local people in development activities and in the 
conservation and management of natural resources seems to be currently at the stage of 
passive or, at best, consultative participation. In order to deal with the severely increasing 
water problems in northern Thailand, decision-makers have to recognize the value of 
participation and promote a change of government officers’ attitude towards local people 
through training programs and incentives. Communities and individuals need to be made 
aware of their constitutional rights and potentials for cooperating with government agencies 
and participating in their projects. 
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PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL PEOPLE IN WATER MANAGEMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE MAE SA WATERSHED, NORTHERN THAILAND
1 
 
Helene Heyd and Andreas Neef 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The attention given to water management has increased lately due to the growing 
problem of water scarcity worldwide and rising conflicts between water users. 
Participation of local people in water management is now seen as a crucial prerequisite 
for the conservation and sustainable use of scarce water resources. Since the late 1990s, 
participatory and integrated water management has been high on the agenda of national 
governments and international donors in the Southeast Asian region. 
After decades of top-down development and state-control of natural resources, the 
Thai government has taken up the issue of participation. The right of local communities 
and authorities to participate in the management of natural resources has been included in 
the 1997 Constitution. This move had its roots in a modest decentralization process that 
took place during the early 1990s when sub-district (tambon) administration 
organizations (TAOs) were established, conferring a greater degree of autonomy and 
fiscal opportunities to local administrations for development planning. The sub-district 
administration – together with the line departments of the major ministries involved in 
resource governance – are now responsible for putting new approaches to participatory 
resource management into practice. 
                                                 
1 The study has been conducted within the Uplands Program - Research for Sustainable Land Use and 
Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of Southeast Asia. The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Eiselen Foundation and thank Claudia 
Ringler, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Mark Rosegrant and Regina Birner for comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper.   
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The livelihoods of the majority of the people in the upland areas of northern 
Thailand depend directly upon water for both household uses and irrigation. As a result 
of the opium substitution programs of the past thirty years, upland farmers’ incomes are 
increasingly derived from the production of cash crops with high water demand, such as 
fruits, vegetables, and cut flowers for the urban markets. Growing water demands due to 
production shifts from rainfed poppy to irrigated crops have led to shortages causing 
yield losses and bottlenecks in household water supply. Village communities and water 
user groups that previously established water management systems in their villages to 
allocate water to their members face increasing difficulties in solving the problems of 
water shortages and rising conflicts. The integration of all stakeholders from a watershed 
perspective and the joint search for problem solution appears to be a viable option to deal 
with the increasing problems of water shortages during the dry season and floods in the 
rainy season. 
The objective of this study is to analyze the state of participatory water 
management in northern Thailand drawing on the case of the Mae Sa watershed in 
Chiang Mai province. The following research questions are discussed: 
1.  Who are the people and organizations that have an interest in water 
management in the Mae Sa watershed? What are the interests of the local 
people in water issues and what strategies do they pursue to achieve their 
aims? 
2.  To what extent is the right of local communities and individuals to participate 
in natural resource management, as included in the current Thai constitution, 
put into practice for water management in the Mae Sa watershed?  
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2.  CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
WATER AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
A watershed is defined as a “land area that drains into a stream” (United Nations 
Environment Glossary 2004). Watershed management refers to “the use, management, 
and investment in a number of inter-dependent resources within (…) ‘watersheds’” 
(Swallow et al. 2001: 449). It implies not only to the management of water, but that of all 
natural resources in a watershed such as forests and other land uses. Watersheds are 
unique areas that are often characterized by their heterogeneity of biological and socio-
economic attributes. Further, the interests of stakeholders, which may differ between 
upstream and downstream users and between sectors of the economy, are very complex. 
“Watersheds are generally large, and diverse individuals and groups have an interest in 
how they are managed. Movements of water, soil, nutrients, and pollutants between 
different parts of a watershed create physical connections between people who are distant 
from each other. In economic terms, watersheds are filled with production and 
consumption externalities.” (ibid.: 450). 
It has been recognized that water resources cannot be seen separated from the 
surrounding ecosystem and the people. The greater attention given to watershed 
management is also tangible in the large amount of funds invested in watershed projects 
over the last years. Even though this paper focuses on a watershed area, the importance of 
other natural resources in the watershed is considered insofar as these are directly related 
to water issues. The emphasis here is put on the management of water and the institutions 




Participation is a broad term used in different disciplines and applied to many 
fields, with many variations in meaning and interpretations. The generic term 
‘participation’ is defined as “the action or state of taking part in something” (Merriam-
Webster Dictionary 1996). Participation in the political sense is a principle for citizens to 
take part in the political process e.g. through elections or referendums. In the context of 
development plans and programs, participation can be defined as “the process through 
which stakeholders influence and take part in decision making in the planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programs and projects” (Kaosa-ard et al. 
1998).  
Different forms of participation exist: Participation can take place in the political 
process, within a development project and in research. Here, the emphasis is placed on 
policy and development, because (1) the issue of participation is discussed from both a 
national and local point of view, (2) it is crucial to what extent the political agencies 
involve local people in water policies and (3) the question is relevant as to which 
possibilities and political channels exist for the people to participate in the development 
of water policies. 
Participation is difficult to evaluate as there are no commonly accepted 
quantitative indicators. It is thus important to distinguish between different levels of 
participation. In their study about participation in the Mekong River Basin, Kaosa-ard et 
al. (1998) describe four stages of participation: information gathering, information 
dissemination, consultation, and participation. Other scholars like Pretty (1995) make a 
more detailed differentiation: passive participation, participation in information giving, 
participation by consultation, participation for material benefits, functional participation,  
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interactive participation, and self-mobilization (Pretty 1995). Taking Pretty’s 
classification as a base, the following levels of participation are being distinguished for 
the purpose of this study in table 1.
2  
Table 1--Forms of participation 
Passive 
participation 
People are being told what is happening. It is a unilateral announcement by 




The information being shared belongs only to external professionals. People 
participate by answering questions posed by researchers using questionnaires 
or surveys. People do not have the opportunity to influence procedures or 
outcomes, as the findings are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.  
Participation by 
consultation 
People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. 
These external agents define both problems and solutions and may modify 
these in the light of people’s responses. 
Participation for 
material benefits 
People participate by providing resources such as labor, in return for food, 
cash or other material incentives. It is very common to call this 
‘participation’ yet people often have no stake in deciding about the processes 
and in extending activities when incentives end. 
Functional 
participation 
People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives 
related to the project. These institutions tend to be dependent on external 
initiators and facilitators but may become self-dependent. 
Interactive 
participation 
People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the 
formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It 
tends to involve interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple objectives 
and make use of systematic and structured learning processes. These groups 
take control/ownership over local decisions, and so people have a stake in 
maintaining structures or practices.   
Institutionalized 
participation 
Participation in theory and practice are included in the political and legal 
national framework and the population has actual decisionmaking power. 
Consultation and joint decisionmaking is a must for project implementations. 
Source: Adapted from Pretty 1995 
 
The issue of participation and its forms, potentials, and problems raise the 
question of the optimal level of involvement of local people. If participation were 
                                                 
2It has to be mentioned that the forms of participation here are put in a hierarchical order, i.e. that passive 
participation is the one having the lowest degree of involvement or decisionmaking power whereas 
institutionalized participation provides people with the best possibilities to take part in joint 
decisionmaking. It is controversial though, if participation for material benefits is a more empowering form 
of involvement than participation by consultation. It depends certainly on the individual case.  
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maximized, local people would have complete control over the natural resources. 
Exclusive management by local communities, however, does not necessarily mean that 
they maintain the resources in the most sustainable way; individual farmers will always 
try to increase their share of the benefit stream of a certain resource and local 
communities in upstream areas might exploit water resources at the expense of 
downstream residents. Thus, the aim of participation may not necessarily be to transfer 
the decisionmaking power completely to local communities but rather to initiate a process 
of negotiation between the stakeholders affected by integrating individual, communal, 
and national interests in a balanced way in the decisionmaking process. This optimum 
can be described with the idea of ‘institutionalized participation’, in which participation 
is integrated into the political process and joint decisionmaking is a sine qua non 
condition for the planning and implementation of development projects.   
Participation is desirable for water management due to the characteristics of 
watersheds. “Because of lateral flows and the cross boundary nature of watershed 
resources, the effect of an application of a technology on one plot is not necessarily 
confined to that plot or the user of that plot. For example, lateral flows of pesticides can 
harm water quality downstream. In the case of non-point source pollution, it is difficult to 
determine the source. Externalities are even more pervasive for resources shared in 
common” (Knox and Gupta 2000). Watersheds comprise a multitude of different actors 
with diverse interests, but the resource flows in the watershed links all the users even 
though they might be widely scattered across the landscape. Participation of stakeholders 
in the watershed in water management may offer solutions for a more efficient and 
sustainable management of water resources. Several studies suggest that “participatory  
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watershed development projects are more successful than externally managed, top-down, 
‘one-size-fits-all’ projects” (Ibid.). A literature review on the potentials and pitfalls of up-
scaling participatory watershed management projects in India underlines this statement. 
“It is now widely accepted that if the productivity of natural resources is to be enhanced 
in a sustainable fashion, then those engaged in and affected by management of the 
resource—the communities—must participate in plans for its rehabilitation and 
management. Their participation will generate a stake in the process and enhance the 
prospects of both institutional and ecological sustainability.” (Turton et al. 1998). A study 
from northern Thailand with villages participating in the management of their watersheds 
and villages with no participation showed that the villages participating had higher 
incomes after completion of the project. Although they had higher opportunity costs due 
to the time spent for meetings and seminars the villagers taking care of their own 
resources benefited from improved water, soil and forest quality and quantity and could 
make use of it through higher yields and thus through a higher income. The success of the 
projects, however, was not only the result of enhanced participation of the people, but 
also due to other aspects such as resource tenure and existent and well-functioning 
institutions which contributed to the increased incomes of the farmers (Empandhu et al. 
1996).  
Another participatory watershed project has been initiated in the Mae Ta Chang 
watershed, Chiang Mai Province. The watershed is located closed to the study area of the 
Mae Sa watershed and has similar conditions. Due to severe water problems and 
conflicts, a watershed commission was set up by local people and NGO activists in 1998 
bringing together representatives of all stakeholders involved in water issues from the  
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watershed. The project was supported by the Thailand Research Fund and by academics 
from Chiang Mai University. The commission gave the local people in an unprecedented 
manner the opportunity to express their concerns and opinions and released some tension 
among them through establishing a dialogue and organizing joint field visits. Further, an 
agreement was found for water use between upstream and downstream communities. 
Although some problems remain unresolved and conflicts are still prevalent, the Mae Ta 
Chang Watershed Commission serves as an example for successful participatory 
watershed projects in northern Thailand.  
 
3.  STUDY SITE AND METHODOLOGY 
SELECTION OF STUDY SITE 
The Mae Sa watershed was chosen as the study area because it is a representative 
site for small-scale commercial agriculture and a high degree of stakeholder complexity 
and actors, which includes upstream and downstream communities, tourist resorts, 
drinking water companies, and several government line agencies. Some of the subunits of 
the government agencies are even located in the watershed area such as the Upstream 
Management Units while the line departments of the district and province administration 
are in Chiang Mai. Further, the watershed had been selected to serve as a pilot project for 
river rehabilitation launched by the Prime Minister in December 2003. The Mae Sa 
stream flows into Mae Ping, which is one of the main tributaries of the Chao Phraya 
river, whose delta constitutes Thailand’s ‘rice bowl’. The Mae Sa watershed includes the 
area from the source of Mae Sa stream until the outlet into the Ping River including all 
the streams and creeks flowing into Mae Sa, which is an area of 142.2 square kilometers.  
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The watershed extends from 20 to 45 kilometers northwest of Chiang Mai, in Chiang Mai 
province, Mae Rim district (Amphoe). Major parts of the watershed are included in the 
Doi Suthep Pui National Park. It covers the three sub-districts (Tambon) Mae Sa, Pong 
Yang and Mae Ram. The main stream, the Mae Sa, has a length of 24 kilometers, with 
about 20 creeks as tributaries. The watershed is an upland area with mountainous terrain 
and altitudes ranging from 300 to 1400 meters above see level. Precipitation differs in the 
watershed among locations and years; the average rainfall is at 1,160 mm, with about 85 
percent concentrated in the rainy season. 
METHODOLOGY 
The results of the study are based on a review of literature, semi-structured 
interviews, and group discussions that have been conducted from March to May 2004 in 
the Mae Sa watershed and in the city of Chiang Mai, northern Thailand. Altogether, 39 
semi-structured interviews and group discussions were carried out, mostly with 
representatives of government agencies and local people. The results presented in section 
4 and the further procedure of selecting respondents for the study on participation 
(section 5) are based on a stakeholder analysis carried out for the Mae Sa watershed. A 
stakeholder analysis is “the identification of a project’s key stakeholders, an assessment 
of their interests, and the ways in which those interests affect project riskiness and 
viability” (ODA 1995). The methodology of research followed a qualitative approach, 
based on semi-structured interviews. It also included on-field observations, open and 
informal talks and tools from the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) portfolio, such as 
rankings, to analyze the perspective of the villagers in regard to the importance and 
benefits of the government organizations. But since the state of participation and the  
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policies of the government agencies are hardly quantifiable, they were assessed through 
the transformation of official policies by staff of government agencies at different 
operational levels, their attitude towards local people and the people’s perception of 
changes in water management. 
 
4.  STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS, POWER RELATIONS, AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED WATER MANAGEMENT 
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 
The people and organizations that have an interest in water issues in the Mae Sa 
watershed can be divided into five stakeholder groups as shown in Table 2:  
1. local people upstream, living in seven communities,  
2. local people downstream (17 villages),  
3. enterprises (20, mostly tourist resorts),  
4. research organizations (Watershed Research Institute, The Uplands Program, 
Chiang Mai University, Mae Jo University), and  
 
5. government line agencies (under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 




Table 2--Stakeholder table for the Mae Sa watershed 
Stakeholder group  Interests  Key Stakeholders  
Local People (Hmong, 
Thai), Upstream 
Water availability at any time for 




Local People (Thai), 
Downstream 
Water availability and quality for 




Kamnan, Kae Muang, 
Kae Fai 
Enterprises  Water quality, no trash in the water, 
conservation of landscape 
Mae Sa Elephant 
Camp, Mae Sa Valley, 
Aura Water Company 
Research Organizations 
Rehabilitation of the rivers, 
research on sustainable land and 






Conservation of forests, rivers and 
national parks, water quality and 
quantity, provision of irrigation 
water  
RID, RFD, National 
Park Department, 
Department of Water 
Resources 
 
In this paper, we emphasize the interests and strategies of local people and the 
attitudes and practices of government agencies towards stakeholder participation in water 
management. 
INTERESTS OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE IN WATER ISSUES 
The watershed is inhabited by 15,426 people with 52 percent belonging to the 
ethnic minority group of the Hmong and 48 percent being northern Thais (Pong Yang 
Sub District Administration Organization 2003). In the past people grew predominantly 
rice, corn, and poppy for opium production. Since the prohibition of opium production in 
the late 1950s the Thai government – with support of international donors – has put an 
enormous effort in replacing poppy by other crops under a range of opium substitution 
programs. Today, farmers in the area cultivate a variety of cash crops, such as vegetables  
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like sweet pepper and cabbage, cut flowers and fruits (mainly litchi). Most of the crops 
have a high demand of water, particularly during the hot dry season which extends from 
March to May. In order to sustain the yields the farmers irrigate their crops during that 
time wherever feasible. The irrigation systems consist of simple water storing devices 
such as small tanks, ponds and small pipes connected to the storage devices or the water 
courses (either natural streams or irrigation channels). The upland villages are not 
connected to a public water supply system but get their domestic and irrigation water 
from rainwater, water harvesting and storing, natural water courses and irrigation 
channels and, in some cases, from groundwater.  
According to interviews with several village headmen, water has become the most 
crucial and contested production factor in agriculture in recent years. The basic interest of 
local people in water management is similar--everybody wants to have reliable access to 
water in sufficient quantity and quality. But when taking a closer look at the interests of 
the water users differences emerge by gender and location. With respect to gender, the 
interests in domestic water and thus in water of good chemical and biological quality is 
often stronger among women. Men usually have a higher interest in the supply of 
irrigation water. However, the management of both domestic and irrigation uses is a 
male-dominated activity.  
The second difference in interests is between upstream and downstream water 
users. The people living in the four Hmong and three Thai upstream communities do not 
have to worry as much about water quantity and quality as the people downstream. Both 
the quality and the quantity of the water released to downstream areas depend on the 
externalities of water use and agricultural production practices of the upstream users.  
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From the differences in water interests several conflicts have arisen. Those conflicts 
occur in Mae Sa watershed within the villages (between users of the same creek, 
reservoir, pond or pipe), between villages (mainly upstream and downstream villages) 
and between unequal partners (like investors with a large estate and local people) or 
between different economic sectors (farmers versus tourist resorts). The conflicts over 
water occur mostly in the hot and dry season when water gets short because of low 
supply (lack of rainfall and high evaporation rates) and high demand (seasonality of fruit 
production and water requirements of cut flowers and vegetables).  
From the local people, some key stakeholders can be identified which also play an 
important role in the solution of the conflicts. The elected village headmen or the village 
committee (which villagers can choose freely) are certainly key stakeholders; they are the 
legitimate representatives of the village and therefore responsible for ensuring an 
adequate supply and management of water. In some villages water committees have been 
established to deal with problems of water allocation. In downstream Thai villages 
traditional irrigation systems (muang fai systems
3) existed or still exist in an adapted 
form. The gae muang and gae fai, who are in charge of the irrigation channels and weirs, 
respectively, and are responsible for the timely and equitable water distribution to all 
members of the systems can also be considered as key stakeholders. The elected head of 
the sub-district (kamnan) and the members of the sub-district (tambon) administration 
(TAO) also have a stake in water management.  
Being farmers themselves, the basic interest of key local stakeholders is similar to 
that of all local people. Their interest as an institution (e.g. as village headman or TAO 
                                                 
3 The muang-fai system (muang = small canal; fai = weir) is a communal form of irrigation 
system which dates back more than 1400 years.  
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representative) is more complex, however. The key stakeholders are concerned about the 
distribution of the water in their area, regulations for water use if necessary, about water 
pricing and about the provision of water storage or irrigation development. The key 
stakeholders all want to avoid conflicts over water even though not all of them favor 
equal distribution. Cases are reported about village headmen, the kamnan and other local 
elites allowing unequal allocation of water to take a lion’s share in the resources or to 
favor their close friends and relatives. 
PROPERTY RELATIONS, ALLOCATION MECHANISMS, AND MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES FOR WATER 
The concept of legal and institutional pluralism describes best the situation of 
water management in the villages of the Mae Sa watershed and thus determines the 
strategies for water management. It refers to the coexistence and interaction of different 
legal orders in the same socio-political space. (Griffiths 1986). According to Meinzen-
Dick and Bruns (2000) and Ganjanapan (2001), this concept can be applied in particular 
to water rights and watersheds where different socio-cultural systems interfere with each 
other and a large heterogeneity of stakeholders exists. Even though the Mae Sa watershed 
is relatively small, the situation of legal and institutional pluralisms holds. As Neef et al. 
(2004) describe in their study, the often perceived concept of water rights being under an 
unregulated common-property system or a de facto open-access regime does not capture 
the reality of water rights and institutions for northern Thailand. The use rights and the 
practice of water utilization are rather bound into a complex governance system that 
reflects the socio-cultural background and local power structures (ibid.). Although water 
is described by the Thai Civil and Commercial Code as a good with a “common benefit 
for the people,” the social structures in the communities determine the management of the  
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water and the allocation patterns. Hence, the property relations of water in the villages are 
not as simple as they appear; instead they are influenced by dynamic social, economic, 
and institutional factors. Even though water is a common pool resource, it is not under a 
uniform common property regime, but under the different property regimes of the 
communities.  
Over the years, the villagers have developed water conveyance systems for 
irrigation and domestic water to deal with increasing water demands. Every village has 
developed its own systems of water management depending on geographical, technical, 
social, cultural, and economic factors. Both upstream and downstream farmers mainly 
use gravity irrigation with simple irrigation devices, like pipes transferring water from 
streams, or irrigation channels, ponds, or tanks. These structures make farmers strongly 
dependent on surface water sources and hence on the climatic and geographical 
conditions. Pumps and wells that would decrease this dependency are exceptions and are 
limited to few outside investors and better-off farmers.  
Irrigation water is managed either in a group or on an individual basis. In 
individual water management schemes, a villager gets his or her own water from a stream 
through pipes or other devices and has no agreements with others about the amount of 
water usage and when he or she can withdraw. This arrangement is mainly observed for 
irrigation water, whereas different types of management patterns (individual, group, 
communal, and a combination of them) can usually be found in the villages. 
Individualized water management is more often observed in Thai villages as an example 
from the Thai village Pong Krai illustrates. The village headman issued a regulation not 
to share pipes with others to prevent arguments and conflicts. Most farmers observe the  
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rule but some have to share pipes for economic reasons. In Hmong communities, water 
management is organized more on a group basis with local elites (usually the descendants 
of the founding families of the village) playing an important role. Conflicts are either 
regulated at the user group or the village level. In the Hmong village of Mae Sa Mai, the 
village water committee decided to reduce the diameter of all pipes to one inch to 
increase the equality of water use. Influential persons, however, continue to use pipes 
with a larger diameter. Problems of water management that cannot be solved by the heads 
of water user groups or by water committees would be brought to the village headman 
and the village committee in both Thai and Hmong communities. In the regular village 
meetings the people have the opportunity to voice their concerns about any issue 
including water. The headman and his committee take the decisions and implement 
resolutions for solving conflicts. Apart from the formal channels, other institutions play 
important roles in the determination of water allocation and in conflict mediation. In 
Hmong communities, for instance, the council of elders and the leaders of the different 
clans play an important role in village-internal affairs. In Mae Sa Mai, the shaman and 
leader of the founding clan of the village coordinates the water use, mediates in disputes, 
and performs the religious ceremony sya-hao-dhale, held annually at the beginning of the 
irrigation season to honor the water spirit and to ensure permanent water flow. 
While the allocation of irrigation water tends to favor the long-established 
families, the politically powerful villagers and the better-off farmers, access to domestic 
water is relatively equitable. Domestic water supply in the villages of Mae Sa watershed 
is mostly organized on a communal basis. Often the villages have at least one principal 
tanks to which all households are connected. Only in some villages are water fees  
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collected either on a monthly or per connection basis (e.g. in the Thai village Pong Yang 
Nai) or per unit of water measured with water meters like in the Hmong village Buak 
Chuan. The case of Buak Toey, another Hmong community, shows that water fees are 
based on the costs of making the water available (installation, electricity), but not the real 
value of water; only those households which draw water from a system with electric 
pumps have to pay a fee, whereas households connected to a gravity supply system can 
get their water free of charge. 
In sum, water management in a village is a complex issue involving formal and 
informal institutions and different levels of management, from the individual and family 
to the group and village level. While collective action arrangements are effective and 
commonly accepted mechanisms for water allocation, local power structures, or 
unfavorable (geographical) conditions can also lead to unequal and non-sustainable water 
management. Participatory policies of the responsible government agencies could help to 
even out unfavorable conditions or unequal distribution between the stakeholders. The 
increasing water shortages and the arising problems and conflicts for the people lately 
show that external support by the government agencies and local administration is needed 
for providing facilities such as reservoirs, canals or weirs, knowledge and expertise, and 
money. Basic water infrastructure like reservoirs or weirs can help the people to 
overcome water shortages but they cannot be provided by the village community and 
rarely by the local administration due to lacking financial resources. These projects, in 
the case of water infrastructure under the responsibility of the Royal Irrigation 
Department and the local sub-district administration, should be planned and implemented 
in a participatory way. The construction of water infrastructure can always affect other  
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people negatively. Thus, the involvement of all stakeholders would initiate a negotiation 
process between them to find solutions acceptable to all interest groups.  
 
5.  STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
THE EMERGENCE OF PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES IN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
For many centuries, communities in today’s northern part of Thailand were under 
the sway of nobles. In the thirteenth century, King Mangrai established dominance over 
the small neighboring principalities and finally founded Chiang Mai as the capital of the 
Kingdom of Lan Na (a million rice fields). He acknowledged the importance of local 
irrigation systems for wet-rice production, expanded irrigation projects by construction of 
canals and established an irrigation law determining regulations for water management 
(Attwater 1997; Surarerks 1998; Elstner and Neef 2004). In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the Kingdom of Siam extended its control to the North, putting in 
place bureaucratic institutions to displace the political power of local nobles. The 
administrative structure remained centralized throughout the twentieth century. By 1932, 
the year when Chiang Mai became a province of Siam, a parliamentary democracy was 
established but many subsequent governments were strongly influenced by the military 
and often removed by coups. Only until the beginning of the 1970’s, the series of military 
regimes could be put to an end and free elections took place. An emerging civil society 
called for democratization and decentralization in the 1980s. Different non-governmental 
organizations started to become active in the movement. One of the results was the 
transformation of sub district councils into Tambon administrative organizations in 1994. 
Another outcome was the current Constitution promulgated in 1997. The so-called  
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“People’s Constitution” was the product of an innovative process of consultations with 
the public and sought to institutionalize a system of checks and balances through the 
decentralization of key functions of power from the central government to independent 
institutions (Laird 2000).  Within the opening of politics in the 1980s and 1990s the 
importance of participatory policies has been recognized and included in the People’s 
Constitution. Article 46 and 56 explicitly gives local communities and individuals the 
right to participate in the management of the natural resources. Article 46 states  
“Local communities which have traditionally been formed by individuals shall 
have the rights to conserve or rehabilitate customs, indigenous knowledge, local 
as well as national arts and culture, and to participate in the management, 
maintenance and balanced and sustainable use of natural resources and the 
environment. The exercise of these rights shall be in accordance with law.”  
 
It was the first time that communal rights to participation in natural resource 
management were mentioned in a Thai constitution which “marks a departure from the 
traditional ‘command and control’ approach whereby the State possesses the sole power 
in resource management to the exclusion of its people, including those whose livelihood 
depends on the use of those resources” (Kaosa-ard et al. 1998). 
Participatory principles and decentralized decisionmaking in natural resource 
management have also been emphasized by the current Thai Government as part of their 
populist policies. Out of the nine ministries with over thirty line departments involved in 
water issues only two ministries are of relevance for the Mae Sa watershed: the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (MoAC) with their corresponding line departments. MoNRE was newly 
established in 2002 as part of a large bureaucratic restructuring process. This involved the 
creation of the Water Resources Department which recruited 1,600 officials from the  
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Irrigation, Public Works, and Health departments and the Prime Minister’s Office. At 
least one representative of MoNRE’s and MoAC’s departments at the provincial or 
district level was interviewed; if the agencies were considered as particularly relevant for 
water management, several officers were interrogated. All interviewed government 
officers unanimously emphasized the importance of the cooperation with the local people 
and their demands. There is a stark contrast, however, between the rhetoric of the 
government officers, in particular the ones in the upper hierarchies, and applications in 
practice. There are few activities with a concrete involvement of local people through 
consultation or the transfer of decisionmaking powers. It was found however, that a 
distinction has to be made between the organizations that promote the conservation of 
natural resources by state authority, such as the Royal Forest Department, and agencies 
which support the development of local communities, like the Royal Project (Neef 2004). 
In the following sections we analyze how participatory principles and policies are 
transformed by government agencies at the local level. 
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
The organizations that promote the social and economic development of the 
people are the Royal Irrigation Department under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and the Royal Project, which has officially the status of a non-governmental 
organization but is supported by government agencies and thus here considered in the 
same section. 
The Royal Project 
The Royal Project has always worked closely together with the local people since 
its stations have been established next to villages of ethnic minorities. The planning of  
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the projects is done mostly in the Royal Project Foundation and its supporting agencies; 
but the officers stated that they also ask the farmers about their opinions and try to plan 
together for the field of research and the topics of trainings and field days for the farmers. 
However, most research ideas are not requested by farmers, but are developed by 
government agencies.  
Trainings, on the other hand, are typically initiated by farmers. For example, the 
Mae Sa Mai station organized a training about the cultivation of several fruit trees like 
persimmon, passion fruit, and star fruit, based on a request by farmers. When the stations 
organize such trainings, field days or demonstrations, the attendance and interest of 
farmers is large as one of the officials said “There is very good participation. Farmers are 
interested as we deal with issues that affect farmers’ everyday life.”
4  
In addition to their relatively close cooperation with the local people the 
interviewed officers in the station next to the Hmong village Mae Sa Mai also had a 
positive attitude towards ethnic minorities. Station officers believe that the local people 
have the capacity to manage their resources and try not to interfere too much in their 
activities. Often the Royal Project Stations act as a mediator between the conservation-
oriented organizations and the local people. 
 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
According to the statements of the officers interviewed, the Royal Irrigation 
Department has adopted participatory policies and recognizes the importance of the 
voices of the people. However, not all officers have the same understanding of 
participation. According to the director of the provincial department in Chiang Mai, 
                                                 
4 Interview with Royal Project Officer, April 27, 2004  
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enhanced participation can be seen through the increase in the demands of local people 
for irrigation facilities. Officers feel that the number of proposals written by the people to 
the RID is due to more participatory policies and not due to any other reasons like more 
pressing water problems or increased population.
5 The higher the rank of the interviewee, 
the stronger he or she emphasized the application of participatory methods. In the 
directory board of the provincial Royal Irrigation Department the officers stressed the 
importance of participation but their confidence in the capacities of local people was very 
low. They stated that local people would need to be educated before they could be more 
involved in resource management.
6 Here, participation appears to be only a label to get 
the projects accepted as one of the head officers mentioned: “If the approach is top down, 
the people do not allow that something is build on their land, so cooperation with the 
people makes it easier to allow to build on their land.”
7 In the lower hierarchy of the RID 
an officer even expressed criticism about the type of ‘participatory’ practice of the RID.  
Interviewer: With the new Peoples Constitution the people are supposed to be involved in 
resource management. How would you describe the situation in the RID?  
RID Officer: After the new constitution the RID is trying to involve the people more and 
it is trying to receive more from the people. The RID has a mobile section. But I feel that 
the RID does not go deep into participation.  
[…] 
Interviewer: What do you mean by saying “participation does not go so deep”? 
RID Officer: (he lowers his voice as there are other people in the office): My personal 
opinion is that government officials should lower themselves to get to the same level as 
the farmers in the village so that they can listen better to the people.
 8   
                                                 
5 Interview with Royal Irrigation Department Officers May, 13, 2004 
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
8 Interview with Royal Irrigation Department Officer. April 02, 2004  
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The mobile section of the RID, doing extension work in the field of irrigation, is 
the division that works closest with the local people. In this section, the staff in contact 
with the people also has a positive attitude towards participation as well as towards the 
local people. They have confidence in their work and their capacities. “The villagers have 
the capacity to manage them [the resources] by themselves; they know a lot, the RID only 
supports them.”
9  
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSERVATION-ORIENTED 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
The conservation-oriented organizations are the line departments under the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment such as the National Park, Plant and 
Wildlife Conservation Department or the Royal Forest Department. Even though the 
officers in these departments also underlined the importance of participation there are 
very few examples of water or watershed projects with actual involvement of local 
people. The structures in the departments are centralized and hierarchical and the major 
decisions are being made in the ministries in Bangkok or at the provincial level. Local 
people are hardly ever asked for their opinion and priorities and, even if consulted, they 
would still not contribute to the final decision of a project. In the following, we discuss 
the findings from our interviews in the most relevant agencies in detail. 
 
Water Resources Department 
According to interviews with officials in several line departments in Chiang Mai, 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in Bangkok has given an order to 
apply participatory policies in the departments. Participation could be important for the 
                                                 
9 Interview with staff from the mobile section of the Royal Irrigation Department, April 30, 2004   
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basin and sub-basin committees that the Ministry has assigned the Water Resources 
Department to coordinate. An official from the Water Resources Department stated that 
they are trying to involve the people in their work and that he considered participation as 
necessary. He reported that many changes have occurred within the government giving 
an illustrating example: “Previously people were looked at like little birds and the 
government as mother bird only gave the food to the little birds. With more participation 
people know what they can get, but also see that they have to sacrifice.”
10 According to 
the officer, the Department tries to apply participatory ideas in the coordination work for 
the committees and working groups where they propose representatives from the villages 
for the different committees. The selection is then done at the village level and they are 
invited by the district. Hence, the department has, to a certain extent, adopted 
participatory approaches but the officers do not have much contact or no contact at all 
with water users. The officer responsible for the coordination work with the committees 
even stated “I am employed in the wrong place, because I am not used to work with 
people, my specialization is in civil construction and I have never done this before.”
11 
This shows that working with local people and involving them as partners rather than 
clients requires qualifications that go beyond technical skills and mechanistic application 
of participatory methods. Nevertheless, it seems that the staff in the Water Resources 
Department has understood the principles of participation and that they have a positive 
attitude towards local people and their involvement. Asked about the capacities of the 
local people to take care of their own resources, the officer stated “Yes, people have 
                                                 
10 Interview with Water Resources Department Officer, May 05, 2004 
11 ibid  
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knowledge and I think it (their participation) will work well.”
12 But the same officer also 
sees problems in participation and, in particular, in the committee work; according to his 
statement the people have to learn to acknowledge the decisions of their representatives 
in the committees, “in the sub-committee the villagers will have to accept what their 
representative has voted for and this might cause conflicts.”
13 
Concluding for the Water Resources Department, it can be stated that due to the 
new creation of the department in 2002 they do not have many activities in general, and 
even less with local people. They are only in contact with other government agencies and 
the TAO. However, the officers seem to have understood the importance of participation, 
even noting that the local people will have to learn to accept decisions taken by their 
representatives, and are willing to apply it in practice, albeit they acknowledge that their 
own capabilities are challenged as some lack the skills to apply participatory methods. 
The structure of the Department appears to be another obstacle for participatory policies: 
The Department has a very centralized and hierarchical structure, where decisions are 
taken in the central agencies in Bangkok and the budget is distributed in equal shares to 
all provinces, irrespective of their demographic, economic, and geographic conditions 
and of ongoing projects. One of the officers voiced his criticism about the distribution of 
the budget, illustrated in the extract of the interview:  
WRD Officer: I don’t understand why every province gets the same budget even though 
they are all different in size. And I even tell the Department about this.  
Interviewer: And are they open to criticism? How do they react to that? 
WRD Officer: I cannot tell directly, you can imagine in the Thai culture that we cannot 
say something like this directly to our boss. But the Ministry has a website where you can 
write comments and there I express my critique.  
                                                 
12 ibid 
13 ibid  
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Interviewer: And you do this anonymously?  
WRD Officer: Yes. 
14  
 
Upstream Management Units 
The Upstream Management Units under the National Park, Plant and Wildlife 
Conservation Department are in close contact with the local people due to the location of 
the stations in the upland areas. One of the principle officers stated that they also have 
adopted participatory policies. “Participation is our main goal. In the past, it was all top-
down, now we have integration of top-down and bottom-up.”
15 Nevertheless, the officer 
does not see any achievements from the introduction of participatory policies as he says 
that the process has just started with the Thaksin Government. As the following interview 
extract shows, however, he does not seem to believe that the local people, in particular 
ethnic minorities, are capable of managing the natural resources on their own.  
Interviewer: How do you see the situation with water in the Mae Sa Watershed? 
UMU Officer: There is a big problem with water. Too many people live in the watershed 
and do farming. The people should change their habits of how to earn their living, they 
should become traders or something else. And also more measures for protection are 
needed, more discipline is needed from the people.  
Interviewer: Where do you see the reasons / causes for water problems? 
UMU Officer: In the destruction of the forest and land. And less rainfall: 70 years ago 
they had 1700 mm of rainfall per year and now they have only 1100 mm per year.  
Interviewer: What measures do you suggest to improve the situation? 
UMU Officer: A compromise of the people is needed. People should not cut the trees and 
burn the forest, not clear the land. The people don’t follow the training, and every unit of 
                                                 
14 ibid 




16 does what they want to do. And even if people participate in the 
trainings, they do not cooperate, people only want more land.
 17 
Even though the same officer told about participation being their main goal, he 
seems not very enthusiastic about working together with the people and involving them 
in their work. In contrast, the temporary staff working at one of the stations in Mae Sa 
watershed has more contact to the people and describes the work in the villages where 
they construct mostly weirs as positive. 
Interviewer: Do you work with the villagers? How often do you go to the villages? 
UMU Worker: Yes, we work together with the villagers. I go to the village every day, 
not only for work but also for example to play football to have a good relation to the 
villagers.
 18  
Although the interviewed workers did not originate from this area, they are fond 
of their jobs and of working with the local people in the villages. Unlike their superior, 
they do not perceive such a gap between themselves and the people they work with. It 
gives the impression that the people being closest to the villagers do not need to follow 
orders of participation from above, but that they are the ones actually putting 
participation into practice by themselves without external force. The central and 
hierarchical structure of the Units, however, are an obstacle for participation; the 
decisions for projects, e.g. for the construction of weirs, comes from the National Park 
Department and sometimes the villagers do not agree with these ideas. Such decisions 
make the work of the upstream workers particularly difficult as they still have to 
convince the local people about the advantage of a project.  
 
                                                 
16 Several Upstream Management Units are placed in upland areas; two of them are located in the Mae Sa 
watershed.   
17 Interview with Officer from the Upstream Management Unit, Chiang Mai, May 04, 2004 
18 Interview with workers of the Upstream Management Unit, April 01, 2004  
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National Park Offices 
The interviewee in the National Park Office mentioned that changes are occurring 
towards better communication between the officers and the people and that the demands 
of the people should be considered more in the future. The officer cautioned, however, as 
demonstrated in the interview extract below, that this process is still in the beginning, that 
the attitude of the people has to change, and that the local people have to be punished if 
they act against the law.  
Interviewer: What do you mean that the communities are more involved now? 
NP Officer: I think, we are at a starting point, in the future we can ask the communities 
more about their demands, but first the awareness of the people has to be created.  
Interviewer: How are you planning to create awareness? 
NP Officer: In the past, there was only law, which created conflict. Now the officers have 
realized that they have to talk to the people. In the past they did not.  
Interviewer: So are you saying that the relationship between officers and the people is not 
ready for asking the people about their demands? 
NP Officer: In the past, there was no communication between the officers and the 
community, now they have to talk more, in the past the officers only arrested [the local 
people].  
Interviewer: Where does this change come from? 
NP Officer: It is the new philosophy of the Ministry [of Natural Resources and 
Environment] of integrated development to make it sustainable.  
Interviewer: Does this correspond also to your point of view? 
NP Officer: I think it is good that the law is going according to the demand of the people, 
but if there are wrongdoers the law is still needed.
19 
 
                                                 




The practices of the Conservation Unit, which also deals mostly with forest fires, 
in terms of participation are expressed in the extract from an interview with the 
responsible officer. 
Interviewer: Do you also work together with people? 
CU Officer: Our real objective, the heart of the park work, is 1. conservation for 
existence, to keep whatever we have and not destroy it, 2. study and research, 3. work for 
recreation purposes.  
[…] 
Interviewer: Do you also work together wit the villagers in the villages? 
CU Officer: Yes, sometimes for demarcation purposes for example.   
Interviewer: Do you also do trainings? 
CU Officer: No, we just go to the villages for suppression to arrest people who cut or 
burn the forest. We combine arresting people and Public Relations work.
20 
 
Office of Highland Development 
The Office of Highland Development (OHD) employs local people in their work 
and thus practices participation through mobilization. Recently, the OHD has engaged in 
a new environmental policy of zoning and demarcating agricultural land and forestland in 
protected areas. In these demarcation projects the farmers do not have a choice if they 
want to participate in the project or not. If their land is within the project area they have 
to take part. 
The officer in the following extract describes the cooperation with the ethnic 
minorities in Mae Sa Mai, one of the pilot areas of land demarcation: 
                                                 
20 Interview with Officer the Conservation Unit of Doi Suthep Pui National Park, April 30, 2004  
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Interviewer: Where do you see the possibilities of farmers to participate in resource 
management? 
OHD Officer: Most farmers in Mae Sa Mai are hilltribes and they are different and so 
cooperation is different. 
Interviewer: Is it difficult to work with them? 
OHD Officer: In the short term it is difficult.  
Interviewer: Why? 
OHD Officer: It is difficult for people to understand, if hilltribe people don’t see the 
consequences then they won’t cooperate.  
Interviewer: Is this different from Thai people? 
OHD Officer: Yes, very different, they have a different culture, different language and 
geography. 
Interviewer: Do Thai people cooperate better? 
OHD Officer: Maybe they understand better.  
[…] 
Interviewer: Are they [the hilltribes] accepting this [the policy of demarcation]? 
OHD Officer: Not all of them, but in the end they have to. In the future they will have 
even more problems because they don’t have birth control, then land and water will 
become even scarcer, and they don’t have any forest anymore to absorb the water, then 
they will not have water for irrigation anymore.
21  
 
In sum, the attitudes of government officers from conservation-oriented agencies 
toward local people and, in particular, towards ethnic minorities, remains negative, and 
they do not have confidence in their capacities to manage the resources autonomously.
22 
The conservation-oriented organizations have problems in devolving power to lower 
                                                 
21 Interview with Officer of Highland Development Office, May 06, 2004 
22 The attitudes certainly differ among individuals and organizations with some being more conservation-
oriented than others. The interviewed officers in the Water Resources Department are an exception insofar 
as they had a quite positive opinion about the local people and their participation in water management. 
However, they focus on the conservation of water resources and are under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment and thus are considered as conservation-oriented. The Water Resources 
Department is a borderline case and their policy in the next few years will show if they orient more towards 
the support of people’s own development priorities.   
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levels because they are afraid that the local people exploit the resources instead of 
protecting them. Passing on responsibilities to lower levels would also mean for the 
conservation-oriented organizations a substantial loss of control over the resources and 
the perceived risk of not being able to fulfill their given tasks in resource conservation. 
 
THE TAMBON ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS: A MEDIATOR BETWEEN 
STAKEHOLDERS INTERESTS? 
The Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organizations (TAOs), established in 
the drive for more decentralization in the mid-1990s, have the potential to assume a 
mediating role between the conservation- and development oriented organizations and 
between government agencies and local communities.   
The TAOs are operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Their 
main objective is to empower local communities in decisionmaking, policy formulation, 
as well as other activities related to community development so as to serve their own 
needs. A TAO consists of two major sections, a Council and an Executive Committee. 
The members of the Council include two elected representative of each village
23. In 
theory, the Executive Committee has extensive powers and functions covering economic, 
social, and cultural development of the sub-district, which includes inter alia, the 
provision and maintenance of infrastructure, waste disposal, development of women, 
children, youth, and senior citizens and the protection and maintenance of natural 
resources and environment (Kaosa-ard et al. 1998). In practice, the TAOs are lacking the 
budget to realize their plans and projects for community development. The 
Decentralization Law of 1999 established to increase local governments’ share in public 
                                                 
23 The sub-district Pong Yang comprised nine villages during the time of the study.  
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spending to 20 percent in 2001 and 35 percent by 2006, but with 8.4 percent actual share 
of TAOs expenditures in total public spending in 2002 fell short of the target 
(Suwanmala, 2002). The budget situation in the sub-district organizations is one major 
reason why the TAOs cannot get involved in many environmental or natural resource 
projects; the focus of the work as shown in the Figure 1 is mainly on small infrastructure 
projects to satisfy the basic needs of the people.  
 
 
Figure 1--Budget plan of the TAO Pong Yang in 2003 
14.5% Administration
7.7% Water Resource Development
0.4% Economic Development
5.9% Natural Resources and Environment
20.2% Human and Social Development
51.3% Infrastructure
 
Source: Pong Yang Subdistrict Administration, 2003 
 
 
The scope for action of the TAOs is further limited as they are not autonomous in 
their decisionmaking; the Tambon budgets and projects must be approved by the District 
Officer, a Ministry of Interior appointee, and the competences given to the TAOs are 
restricted by other government departments which still hold the decisionmaking power in 
certain areas (Badenoch 2002). For example, as regards forest utilization in the national 
parks, the National Park, Plant and Wildlife Department has to make the decisions about  
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any projects in these areas. In areas covered by the Royal Project Foundation, most 
government activities have been coordinated by working groups chaired by Royal Project 
representatives, following a decree by the Office of the Prime Minister. Thus, in many 
fields the TAOs lack the power to counterbalance the influence of both the conservation- 
and development-oriented organizations due to their limited mandate.  
EVALUATION OF PARTICIPATORY POLICIES 
For the evaluation of the participatory policies of the government agencies 
Pretty’s classification for different levels of participation is used in Table 3.  
 
Table 3--Level of participation as applied by different government agencies 
Type of Participation  Departments applying  
Passive participation  Conservation Unit (MoNRE) 
  National Park Offices (MoNRE) 
  Royal Irrigation Department (MoAC) 
  Royal Forest Department (MoNRE) 
Participation in information giving  Water Resources Department (MoNRE) 
  Royal Irrigation Department (MoAC) 
  Royal Forest Department (MoNRE) 
  Royal Project  
Participation by consultation  Royal Irrigation Department (MoAC) 
 Royal  Project 
Participation for material benefits  Office of Highland Development 
(MoNRE) 
Functional participation  - 
Interactive participation  - 




As a synthesis it can be stated that the participatory policies of the government 
agencies are mostly only at a passive level or at the level of information provision. The 
development-oriented organizations go beyond this and involve local people also through 
consultation. Two organizations, both conservation-oriented, involve local people 
through labor. But as described above and confirmed by the interviewed people, 
consultation and labor involvement does not necessarily have an influence over the 
decisions made and the projects implemented. Moreover, participation for material 
benefits is not automatically a better form of participation. In the case of the Office of 
Highland Development the participation of the people in the project is compulsory. 
People have to participate if their cultivated land is in the area of the demarcation project 
of the office.  
PERCEPTION OF THE PEOPLE 
The establishment of the Tambon Administrative Organizations is certainly the 
main improvement in terms of enhanced participation for the local people. The TAO 
council is constituted by two representatives from each village within a sub district, 
which gives every village the chance to present their problems in an open forum and 
bring them to a political arena. Decisions are being made by the executive board of the 
TAO, elected by the council, which has the power to take certain decisions affecting local 
communities, mainly in the field of infrastructure development. The main impediments 
for the work and the functioning of the TAOs are budget constraints and their restricted 
mandate. Many competences are still concentrated in the hands of the government 
agencies and can block or undermine the actions of the TAOs. Insufficient financial 
resources are a big constraint insofar as most of the TAOs can only concentrate on some  
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basic infrastructural necessities of the sub-district, like the construction of roads or small 
water storage facilities. The TAOs lack the financial resources to take up major projects 
that would be necessary for a better management of the natural resources. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, certain improvements towards greater public 
participation are already perceived by the local people. 
Another noticeable change in terms of participation for the local people is the 
increasing involvement of local representatives in different committees such as river-
basin committees, sub-committees, and working groups, which have been established in 
the last years by the Thai government with support of the Asian Development Bank in an 
effort to promote integrated water management. The river basin management approach 
and the invitation of local people is certainly a step towards more public participation in 
water management. But the work in the committees has not progressed much even though 
they have been meeting for several years in some cases. At the local level, the 
administrative officers who lead the committees do not share the same enthusiasm to 
work with the people as intended in the plans by the government. The officers are not 
prepared to treat the local people as equal partners and the opinion of the people, if they 
are able to express it, does not necessarily have an influence over the decisions in the 
committees.  
Although small changes are noticeable for the local people, the possibilities for 
participation stand in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of the government officers and the 
principles of the constitutional framework. The ordinary villager can hardly feel any 
differences or achievements in terms of participation in managing natural resources. 
What they perceive regarding water management are increasing water shortages and  
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floods, an enhanced involvement of the TAO in mediating conflicts, and a village 
community that strengthens its own capacity in organizing water allocation and dedicates 
more time and effort to the management of water resources. The contrast between the 
rhetoric of the government officers and the reality at the community level is striking at 
first. But the analysis of the participatory policies of the local government agencies above 
explains why so few of the announced changes arrive at the local level. Even though the 
officers emphasize the importance of participatory policies and the involvement of the 
local people, their lacking willingness to really devolve power to a lower level and to 
pass on responsibilities to the local people in resource management elucidate the few 
noticeable improvements at local level.  
The general attitude of the local people towards the government officers is still 
characterized by skepticism and mistrust. This is particularly true for the Hmong who do 
not perceive them as supporters but as intruders to the villages who, at best, ignore their 
priorities or, in the worst case, arrest them for encroaching into forestland. Figure 2 
illustrates the results of group discussions with villagers in one Hmong and one Thai 
community about the organizations that support them most and are most influential in 
terms of water management. One might have expected that the people would feel that the 
village communities and the TAO help them most, and that government organizations 
such as the RID are seen as most influential. However, the majority of the interviewed 
villagers consider either the village community or the TAO as most supportive and also 
as most influential. The local people rely on their community and on the TAO for support 
and also feel that the community and the TAO have the biggest influence and power over 
water management.  
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Figure 2--Benefit and power of different organizations involved in water 
management as perceived by villagers in two local communities of Mae Sa 
watershed (Buak Toey and Pong Yang Nai) 
 
 
Another argument for the few tangible changes for villagers is the lack of 
opportunities to express their disapproval. They can present a complaint to the TAO 
representative of their village but beyond that there are not many channels for them to 
express their opinion. Although, according to the 1997 Constitution, citizens have the 
right to information, to public hearings, and to legal action against projects affecting them 
negatively, but ordinary villagers lack the necessary knowledge, capital, and relations to 
influential persons to file such a suit. On the one hand, the recently introduced rights in 
the constitution require institutionalized patterns for their realization such as civil rights 
action; on the other hand, the people need to be aware of their rights to be able to make 












water, such as water shortage in a creek, he or she would first talk to relatives or other 
users of the creek to find a solution. If this is not successful he or she would bring the 
issue to the village headman or to a meeting of the water user group. These groups have 
been established autonomously in most local communities as a self-help mechanism to 
manage water from commonly used water sources. However, these water user groups are 
sometimes dominated by local elites and do not always guarantee equal access to water 
for all villagers (Neef et al. 2004). In the interviews it became apparent that people do not 
even know that they could use other channels beyond the village community, such as 
contacting a government agency directly if they have a problem. 
Among the politically influential villagers such as TAO members, the head of the 
sub-district Kamnan or village headmen, the perception is different. They are in contact 
with the government agencies and do feel that the possibilities for participation have 
increased. They can express their opinions, are invited to committee meetings, and are 
being consulted. In addition, the TAO has received more money in the past few years. All 
interviewed persons described these changes as positive, but none of them is satisfied 
with the status quo. They feel that they cannot make their voices heard and that they are 
powerless against decisions of other government agencies. As one village headman 
mentioned when he was requested to report about perceptible changes in participation 
“before they didn’t ask us about anything, now they talk to the people and ask about 
opinions, but this is only verbal. (…) Now they talk more, in theory this is good, but in 
practice it didn’t change anything.”
24 
 
                                                 
24 Interview with Village Headman of Ban Buak Chan, June 01, 2004  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years water problems have become a severe problem for the people in 
the uplands of northern Thailand. Droughts in the dry season threaten the villages’ water 
supply for domestic and irrigation uses. The local people deal with growing water 
problems in their villages through uniquely established water supply systems. Over the 
years, every village has developed its own management system. The water in the villages, 
a common pool resource, is not under an open access regime as misinterpreted by some 
government agencies. Neither is it necessarily under a common property regime; instead 
the property regime of the water in the villages is subject to different tenure regimes and 
determined by a range of local factors such as power structures, kinship relations, 
geographic conditions, technical choices, and socio-economic settings in the villages. 
Management systems at group and communal level are often able to deal with water 
allocation in an efficient way, but they do not necessarily provide the fairest or most 
sustainable form of water governance. 
Thailand, a traditionally centralized country, has made attempts to devolve power 
to lower levels in the 1990s through the establishment of the Tambon Administrative 
Organizations and the recent People’s Constitution. In the 1997 Constitution local 
administrative units such as the TAOs and individuals are given the right to participate in 
the management of natural resources. 
Moreover, the line departments at the district and provincial levels have been 
given orders to apply participatory policies in water resource management. Certain 
participatory projects have been included in the plans of the departments at the local 
level, and all government officers stated that they have adopted participatory policies. But  
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the interviews revealed that the officers are not prepared to really involve the people in 
joint decisionmaking and the departments are not ready to release power to the local 
people. This applies in particular to the conservation-oriented government organizations 
such as the National Park, Plant and Wildlife Department, which are afraid of yielding 
responsibility over resource conservation to the people who, they think, would exploit the 
resources. In the development-oriented departments, some officers with closer contact to 
the people try to apply participatory approaches but they lack both the necessary skills 
and the support from their superiors to really engage in a collaborative process with the 
local people that would open spaces for negotiation of interests.  
Accordingly, at the village level the changes in the government agencies are 
hardly noticeable, and the local people can barely feel that the possibilities for 
participation have improved. A negative image remains of government officers, and the 
people rely on their own regulations for water management instead of contacting the 
government agencies for help. What is perceptible for the local people is the involvement 
of the TAO and a larger number of meetings and committees to which only politically 
influential people like the village headmen or TAO representatives are invited. Among 
these key stakeholders, the perception of changes is different. They are in closer contact 
with the government agencies and can see that changes are occurring towards more 
involvement of the people. Nevertheless, the newly introduced policies are still not 
enough for them and appear to the local elites rather as a justification for the pre-
conceived actions of the agencies. Taking Pretty’s classification as a reference, 
participation occurs, if local people are being involved at all, only as passive 
participation, in information giving, rarely by consultation, and in the case of the Office  
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of Highland Development, for material benefits. In communities covered by the Royal 
Project, people are being consulted, and even the RID sometimes asks the people about 
their priorities. But the choices are still being made in the government agencies and so the 
people have neither real decisionmaking power nor institutionalized patterns to 
participate in the management of their resources. The constitutional right for participation 
in resource management is not sufficiently put into practice and the optimal level—where 
participation consists of a negotiation process between all stakeholders to balance their 
interests and find solutions together—is far from being reached for water issues in 
Thailand.  
 
7.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This case study from the Mae Sa watershed demonstrates that it is not enough to 
put participation on the political agenda and give orders about the implementation. The 
involvement of local people in the political process and in research and development 
requires more fundamental changes in the structure of the government agencies and 
among their staff. Government officers need to change their attitudes towards local 
people and have to learn that participation is not only a tool to improve project outcomes, 
but also an objective in itself. The universities and schools - where the government 
officers get so far only their technical education in e.g. engineering, forestry or 
agriculture - need to extend their curricula by modules on participatory research and 
development. Further, seminars and trainings that provide the necessary communication 
and facilitation skills for working with local people should be offered for the government 
staff already in office. Reducing the mistrust between government officials and local  
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people is certainly a long process but could be facilitated through the establishment of 
pilot sites where the success of cooperation between government officers and local 
people is demonstrated as exemplified by the case of the Mae Ta Chang watershed. 
While improving government officers’ knowledge and skills in applying participatory 
approaches is necessary, it is certainly not sufficient; the local people also have to be 
made aware of their rights and increased possibilities under these new policies. However, 
participation per se is not necessarily only positive for local people. Participatory 
processes require compromises between the stakeholders and do not only provide 
benefits to local people but might involve disadvantages to certain groups that have been 
favored before. Upstream populations, in particular, are likely to loose their previously 
exclusive control over water resources. The Tambon Administrative Organizations could 
play an important role in their mediator function between local people and government 
agencies and between upstream and downstream communities. The TAO representatives 
could raise awareness among the local communities about possible benefits and 
compromises through participation in e.g. village meetings. Moreover, the TAOs could 
establish better contacts between the local people and the government officers by, for 
example, inviting officers to the village meetings or to discussions with local people. 
  The example from Mae Sa watershed has shown that water management 
in Thailand has reached a crossroad. The government has yet to demonstrate that its 
newly declared openness to participatory approaches is more than just another populist 
strategy to win votes in rural areas. The fate of the draft Water Resource Bill–based on 
consultations with grassroots groups and local people in Thailand’s 25 river basins–will 
give proof of the sincerity of the government to institutionalize participatory approaches  
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to water management. The real test will be how much of its people-centered principles 
will be watered down through the series of public hearings and the contestation of its 
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